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“Those who are in authority are of two groups: the scholars and the rulers. If they are 
upright, the people will be upright; if they are corrupt, the people will be corrupt.”  
(Ibn Taymiyyah) 
Abstract 
This paper utilises a political lens in considering the cause for the production of 
corruption and the role of political leadership. Specifically, the notion of personalisation 
of power as advocated by Slater (2003) is adopted to portray how the adoption of 
neoliberalism ideology by an aspiring autocratic leader results in the weakening of the 
infrastructural power through three strategies: packing, rigging and circumventing. We 
use Perwaja Steel as a case study to demonstrate the modus operandi of corruption in a 
state-owned enterprise in Malaysia.  
Key words: corruption, neoliberalism, personalisation of power, Perwaja Steel, crony 
capitalism, Malaysia  
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Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production  
of corruption  
 
1. Introduction 
Malaysia is often quoted as a good example of a successful moderate Islamic country 
(Borneopost, 28 June 2012). It is ranked as the “37th best country in the world and among 
the top three Asian countries in the global standing” for doing business (The Staronline, 
21 August 2010), and is also a world leader for Islamic finance.  Despite its impressive 
achievements, there are increasing underlying concerns over the last two decades on the 
growth and persistence of corruption in the country, which is not only destroying its 
international reputation as a safe and equitable environment for investment but also 
immensely harming the quality of life of its people (Ibrahim, 2013).  According to the 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, prosecution of corruption cases in the form of 
bribery, malpractices, abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and misappropriation of 
funds has increased to 520 cases during 2011 as compared to 432 cases in 2010 (MACC, 
2012).  In fact, Malaysia is ranked fifth (after China, Russia, Mexico, and India) among 
the top 10 countries for illicit capital flight, accounting for almost 40.3 percent of 
cumulative illicit financial flows from developing countries between 2003 to 2012 and 
ranked third (after China and India) among Asian countries in exporting illicit capital to 
rich countries (Global Financial Integrity, 2014). In spite of the major reforms in curbing 
corruption being launched by the past and current governments, it has continued to slide 
down in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)1 ranking from 36th position in 2011 to 
50th in 2014 (Global Financial Integrity, 2014).2  
                                                          
1 Refer to Transparency International; CPI measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 183 
countries and territories around the world.  
2 Malaysia was ranked as the 53rd in 2013 Transparency International website, 2011 (accessed from 
 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results on 6 March 2015).   
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When Malaysia gained independence in 1957, corruption was hardly an issue but 
has grown since the 1970s. Furthermore, as an Islamic country with Muslim leadership, 
Malaysia is expected to be clean from corruption as Islam strongly forbids and condemns 
such malpractices. It is mentioned in the Hadith: “God cursed the one who pays a bribe, 
the one who takes it and the mediator between the two” (Sahih Muslim)3 and in the Quran 
(11:85): “And O my people! Give full measure and weight in justice and reduce not the 
things that are due to the people, and do not commit mischief in the land, causing 
corruption.” The question that arises is why corruption continues to grow and in fact, 
escalating to bigger scales in the country in recent years? 
The extant literature on corruption has acknowledged that it is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon, as it exhibits different forms and functions in diverse contexts, 
with multiple causes and effects (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis and Kim, 2013).  Nevertheless, 
there is mutual agreement that it entails the abuse of public power, roles or resources for 
private benefit (Amundsen, 1999; Johnston, 2005), which may exist at the interface 
between public and private sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or between international 
actors and host countries (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999; Bayart et al., 1999).  One strand 
of studies in this area is on identifying the root causes and the appropriate preventive 
measures that can be taken.4  Discussion on the causes of corruption, which can be 
attributed to individuals, organizations, and institutions, has been grouped in the literature 
as either the demand-side (referring to the taking) or the supply-side (referring to the 
giving) of corruption (Heimann and Boswell, 1998; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). This strand 
of literature further classified the preventive solutions into control (aimed at improving 
                                                          
3 Cited in Islam message of peace, available at 
https://islammessageofpeace.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/riba-is-haraam-for-the-one-who-takes-it-and-
the-one-who-pays-it-and-it-is-haraam-to-help-with-it-in-any-way-whatsoever/ 
4 For a good summary and overview of the literature on the definitions, consequences and causes of 
corruption, see Everett, Neu & Rahaman (2006), Tanzi (1998) and Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener 
& Søreide (2000). 
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legal, electoral, educational and other institutional systems), exit (alternatives or 
substitutes available to actors in exiting the situation) and voice (respecting a wide array 
of perspectives, desires, and forms of practical knowledge) strategies (see Everett, Neu 
& Rahaman, 2006; 2007). These studies rightly acknowledged that this global problem 
and its subsequent solution will always be debatable as the field’s actors view the problem 
in different ways due to differences in the ‘‘idiomatic, epistemological, ontological and 
moral correspondences’’ (Rose and Miller, 1992; p. 179). 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the debate on corruption using the lens of 
political power. We argue that the personalisation of power (Slater, 2003) by the political 
leadership imbued with neoliberalism ideology induced the production of corruption.  
Using one of the largest financial scandals in a state-owned enterprise during the 
premiership of Mahathir Mohamad as a case study, we provide evidence on how an 
aspired autocratic leadership managed to personalised power and weakened the 
infrastructural apparatus that provides the necessary check and balance. This, in turn, 
facilitated the production of corruption on both the demand and supply side.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the notion of 
personalisation of power and mechanisms of personalisation that can be utilised in 
transforming a democratic system into an autocratic regime as well as explain how the 
adoption of neoliberalism ideology may further facilitate the production of corruption. 
Section 3 presents the case study and discusses the modus operandi of the production of 
corruption, as well as the roles of the various actors.  The last section concludes the paper 
with some reflections and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production of corruption 
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The fundamental purpose of any democratic institutions is to provide stable patterns of 
popular representation. According to Mann (1988, p.5), one way this can be achieved is 
by constraining the chief executive's ‘despotic power’, referring to the range of actions 
that an individual leader is empowered to take without routine, institutionalized 
negotiations with other regime members (i.e. the power to decide).  The raison d'etre in 
authoritarian institutions is to supply a regime with the ‘infrastructural power’ (i.e. the 
power to govern) which is necessary if command over potential opposition in civil society 
and within the multiple layers of the state apparatus itself is to be implemented.  In other 
words, while democratic institutions serve to keep the chief executive in check, 
authoritarian institutions serve to keep the opponents under wraps (Mann, 1988).  
According to Slater (2003), in semi democratic regimes, personalisation of power by any 
aspiring autocrat requires high levels of infiltration into infrastructural powers in order to 
command the whole country.  Three mechanisms that can be utilised by the aspiring 
autocrat to personalise his/her power include: packing, through commandeering the 
power of an existing institution for personal purposes; rigging, through the strategic 
modification of institutional rules and procedures to forestall competition for leadership 
positions; and circumventing through either the creation of entirely new organizations or 
demand for existing organizations to take on entirely new tasks which implies the 
squandering of at least a portion of a regime's institutional inheritance (Slater, 2003; 
p.91).  This process is further made possible in such regimes through the adoption of 
neoliberalism. 
Historically, neoliberalism ideologies as championed by Keynes were associated 
with the role of the state in constraining the mobility of capital and in redistributing 
wealth for a more equitable and just society (Sikka, 2015). However, over time, the idea 
of the control of capital by the state was challenged by Hayek (1944) who argues that 
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market prosperity, stability and social justice can be achieved through free market and 
minimum state intervention while still providing minimum provision to those who cannot 
earn a living in the market (Tebble, 2010). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Harvey 
(2005) observes further expansion of free market competition, mobility of capital and no 
state intervention in the economic sphere in the name of attaining social efficiency.  This 
rebranding of neoliberalism resulted in total loss of state control over organisations and 
individuals and enabled competitive beings to indulge in endless pursuit of private gains 
and in legitimising their activities (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).  
The embracement of neoliberalism ideologies by western powers is not only 
confined in their own territories but also exported to other developing countries through 
foreign direct investments (Sikka, 2015) and other tools deemed necessary for 
modernising their economies. The neoliberalists have managed to convince the political 
elites in developing countries “that the system is natural, fair and fundamentally better 
than any realistic alternative” (Sklair, 1995; p.98), which in turn either directly or 
indirectly made them to believe in their own inferior socio-political and economic setting 
as compared to advanced nations. This inferiority complex results in political elites in 
developing countries to voluntarily embrace the structures and values of their western 
counterparts, as opposed to other alternatives that may be more suitable in fulfilling local 
needs, and may also be motivated by the obvious private rewards that can be gained 
through close relationship with business elites who needed them in order to survive in the 
competitive market. This symbiotic relationship led to the state becoming nothing more 
than a façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations, clientelism 
(including nepotism and cronyism), and political corruption (Hope and Chikulo 2000; 
Chabal and Daloz 1999). Adoption of neoliberalism weakened the distinction between 
public and private which dominates the politics of some countries, especially in Africa 
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and some parts of South-East Asia.  
Unlike neoliberalist political leaders in democratic countries who are subject to 
public scrutiny if their style of reconfiguring the resources may have negative impact on 
society, their counterparts in developing countries may use mechanisms of 
personalisation of power to silence their opponents and critics especially when there is a 
lack or weakened infrastructural power (public and legal institutions). 
Another outcome of the adoption of neoliberalism is crony capitalism, a system 
where significant parts of the economy are controlled by the government and political 
elites who will use the power of the state to make decisions in the best interests of a 
particular set of well-connected businesses, rather than in the best interest of the market 
as a whole (Girling, 1997; Chang, 1998; Krugman, 1998; Wade, 1998; Haber, 2002). 
Harvey (2005) succinctly defined crony capitalism as corrupt relationships between the 
state and businesses.  In the extreme case, crony capitalism can degenerate into corruption 
when contracts and appointments are awarded to families and friends (nepotism) without 
merit or transparent procurement process.  Similarly, crony capitalism, assists in 
generating plutocracy, whereby a small minority of the wealthiest citizens rule the 
country (Phillips, 2004) or kleptocracy, where the political elites seek to increase their 
personal wealth often in the pretence of providing honest service to the society i.e. 
corruption rule by theft (Bush, 2006).  While both plutocracy and kleptocracy seem to 
favour the political elites, their closeness with business corporations including accounting 
firms, intensify the production of corruption.  
 
2.1 The Malaysian context  
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Malaysian politics has been dominated by the National Front or Barisan Nasional (BN)5 
communal coalition party, with administration of the country being in the hands of the 
leader of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) political party. The country 
has been under six premierships6 including the present one. However, it was Mahathir’s 
twenty two years of premiership that has significantly transformed Malaysian political 
and socio-economic landscape that persists till the present day. According to Gomez and 
Jomo (1999), the neoliberal policies and discourses that assist in wealth accumulation 
and concentration through political patronage intensified during Mahathir’s 
administration.  When he came into power in 19817, he was inspired by the success of 
the four Asian Tigers or Asian Dragons8 that had developed into advanced and high-
income economies through rapid industrialisation. Hence, through his ‘Look East’ policy, 
Mahathir utilized greater state intervention to promote heavy industrialization to emulate 
Japan and South Korea. The state-sponsored and HICOM-led program of heavy 
industrialization was mostly implemented in joint-ventures with Japanese firms, and the 
HICOM enterprises were primarily financed by heavy borrowing from the Japanese 
government at very low interest rates (Jomo, 2003).  
In 1984, Mahathir appointed Daim Zainuddin, a successful businessman and a close 
friend, as his economic advisor.  Under the Malaysian Incorporation Policy, significant 
economic policy reversals which include regressive fiscal (tax and spending) reforms, 
                                                          
5 BN or the National Front Party was formed in 1973, replacing the Alliance Party which was formed in 
1957. It consists of three communal political parties: the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and the secular United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). There 
two political opposition parties before 1998 are the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP).  
6 Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1969), Abdul Razak (1969-1976), Hussein Onn (1976-1981), Mahathir 
Mohammad (1981-2003), Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib Razak (2009 to present).   
7 His ascend to power was just after Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of Britain in 1979 and 
Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, both of whom are known to be the 
champions of neoliberalism doctrine. 
8 This term is used to refer to the highly free and developed economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. 
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more stringent public expenditure cuts, privatization, deregulation, and financial 
liberalization were implemented (Jomo, 2003).  This policy and the earlier National 
Economic Policy (NEP),9 succeeded in creating a small group of super-rich bumiputra 
(indigenous group) class but failed to achieve its main objective of reducing economic 
inequalities among the indigenous group; in fact it actually widened social inequality 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Other reports highlighted that Malaysia’s level of inequality 
was among the highest reported in the region, with a Gini coefficient10 of 0.49 during 
2000 (Netto, 2004), while at the same time the rich are getting richer in Malaysia. The 
widespread poverty in Malay dominated states caused some UMNO supporters to 
question the policies that focused on privatisation and heavy industries run by favoured 
businessmen (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006), including those with family and friendship 
ties. To ease the friction, the ruling party created a ‘new middle-class’ Malay 
professionals (Rahman, 2002) and this frustrated some of the Malay elite groups who 
monopolised most of the country’s concessions or rents, causing them to switch their 
loyalty from UMNO to the opposition party, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Malaysian 
Justice Party) led by Anwar Ibrahim.11  
From 1985 onwards, business regulation for inter-ethnic redistribution purposes as 
required under the NEP and the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, was abandoned. This 
further intensification of political patronage with certain bumiputra and non-bumiputra 
                                                          
9 Before 1969, the ruling party adopted a liberal agenda with minimal state intervention which resulted in 
excessive accumulation of wealth by the Chinese ethnic group.  Frustrated with unequal wealth distribution 
coupled with violation of Islamic principles in social and political policies, sparked the May 13 ethnic riot 
in 1969 (Hooker and Othman, 2003). Following the riot, Abdul Razak introduced the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), a twenty-year social re-engineering and affirmative action plan to eliminate the identification with 
economic function as well as to increase enterprise ownership by the bumiputra (indigenous group).  
10 Gini coefficient: a measurement used to evaluate income inequality where 0 indicates perfect equality 
and 1.0 indicates perfect inequality (Worldpress.org).  
11 He was the former Finance Minister, deputy PM and UMNO deputy president who was punished and 
removed from government office in 1998 and imprisoned by Mahathir for sexual impropriety allegations 
and other corruption charges. He is currently serving a 5 year-term after being implicated again for sodomy 
charge under PM Najib’s administration. 
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businessmen do not only brought mutual benefits to the two groups but also seen as 
important for the development of business interest (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). When the 
first recession hit in 1985-1987, many Malaysian corporations, especially those 
associated with the regime’s ‘cronies’, were very highly leveraged but they were 
protected and supported through government bailouts to ensure that Mahathir achieved 
his goals of making Malaysia a fully-developed industrial country through his Vision 
2020 policy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).   
When the 1997 financial crisis erupted, Mahathir was once again anxious to protect 
and organize bail-outs for the cronies, which led critics to charge that the regime’s cronies 
were doubly blessed – first by benefiting from privatization in the 1980s, and then by 
walking away unscathed from their debts and liabilities through bail-outs using public 
funds (Jomo, 2003). Mahathir also has an obsession for mega-projects and it was during 
his time that the Petronas Twin Towers, KLIA, Putrajaya and Sepang Grand Prix Circuit 
were developed. Critics at that time expressed doubts that the country’s resources had 
been put to the best and most productive use and some economists were concerned on the 
financial implications (huge government debts) and depleted natural resources for the 
next generation of Malaysians (Netto, 1999) as a result of these mega ventures.   
In short, under Mahathir, Malaysia experienced 20 years of privatizing profits and 
profitable assets and socializing of losses and liabilities (Jomo, 2003).  The perpetrators 
were not made accountable and overly protected which may be attributed to the 
personalization of power by the leadership. Leong (1992, p. 243) commented that “… 
under the Mahathir administration, the Cabinet is no longer used as a forum, but rather 
as a rubber-stamp institution that gives legitimacy to government policies.” Similarly, 
Leigh (2001, p.7) succinctly commented: 
“…the most enduring consequence of the Mahathir era has been a deliberate and 
decisive weakening of Malaysia's institutions, including the judiciary, the royalty, 
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the independent civil service, the parliament, the electoral system and....The 
institutions of governance are much weaker, and rulership has been personalized.”  
 
The personalisation of power was achieved by packing the most important posts in 
the cabinet and institutional infrastructure with loyalists, and he himself subsuming 
another two vital posts, home minister and finance minister in 1998. Rigging of the 
political party’s procedures facilitated his personal domination of the hegemonic political 
organization (Slater, 2003) and in centralising the ruling party’s power in a few 
executives’ hands (Gomez, 2004; Saw and Kesavapany, 2006).  Circumvention was used 
in silencing and later ousting the then Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who had 
opposed to bail-outs using public funds.12 He appointed Daim as the ‘virtual finance 
minister’ (Erickson and Shameen, 1998) and also allowed himself direct control over a 
variety of discretionary funds to prepare strategic bailouts for his key allies in the 
corporate sector (Slater, 2003).  
In the next section we present a case as evidence on how neoliberalism ideology 
and personalisation of power by a political leader facilitated the production of corruption 
in a state-owned enterprise. The research was conducted through scrutinizing newspaper 
articles, website commentaries, books and journal articles related to the company and 
major actors. Although there are other scandals involving state-owned companies in 
Malaysia, we chose Perwaja Steel as our case as it was one of the largest scandals at a 
time when personalisation of power had just started to develop.  
 
3. Production of corruption in Perwaja Steel 
                                                          
12 Mahathir and Daim instructed the Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim to suspend KLSE rules to allow the 
leading crony UEM-Renong conglomerate a bailout. That move caused the stock market capitalization to 
fall by RM 70 billion, or 20 percent, in three days in November 1997 (Jomo, 2003). These policy 
divergences between Mahathir and Anwar had caused the latter a heavy price. In 1998, Anwar was 
imprisoned for five years on sodomy allegation. 
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3.1 Company background 
Perwaja Terengganu was formed on 22 April 1982 with a paid up capital of RM 250 
million as a joint-venture between the government agency, Heavy Industries Corporation 
of Malaysia (Hicom Ltd) and Nippon Steel Corp.13 The project was meant to be the 
crowning jewel of the industrialization drive under Mahathir’s Look East policy. The 
Japanese company built a billet-making plant and a direct-reduction facility to smelt ore 
into hot briquetted iron based on a new technology. The direct-reduction plant never 
functioned properly and by 1986, the joint-venture project accumulated losses of RM 131 
million. This was attributed to management problems and appreciation of the Japanese 
yen which affected its interest payments on a yen loan totaling RM 815 million (The 
Malay Mail, 10 February 2004). In 1987, Nippon Steel gave up its 30 percent stake in 
the company and Hicom was stripped of its 51 percent stake, ending with the Malaysian 
government owning 81% of Perwaja Terengganu's equity and 19% held by the 
Terengganu state government. In 1987, Mahathir handpicked his trusted associate, Eric 
Chia,14 to spend six months in the company to report why the project was failing. In 1988, 
Eric was formally appointed as the managing director of Perwaja Teregganu and during 
this period, more than 10 proposals were received by the government to turn the RM 1.2 
billion plant into a profitable venture but it was left to become insolvent in 1988.  
Based on a 10-year plan and with fresh capital from government funding and 
commercial loans from Bank Bumiputra15 (RM 860 million) and the Employee Provident 
Fund (EPF-RM 130 million), a new company, Perwaja Steel was set up in 1989. Eric and 
                                                          
13 Hicom owned 51%, Nippon 30% and Terengganu state government 19%. 
14 He is a Singapore-born Chinese entrepreneur who became a successful and prominent businessman in 
Malaysia. He came to Malaysia at the age of 23 and managed United Motor Works (UMW) set up by his 
father. The company became the country’s largest engineering group. He established strong friendship with 
Mahathir who supported his business through major government contracts. In 1987, he helped rescue a 
haulage and logistic company set up by Mahathir. He was nicknamed Mr Fixit as he is often called upon 
to help the political elites when their businesses are in trouble (The Staronline, June 25, 2008).  
15 UMNO is a major shareholder of the bank. 
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his board of directors, who included representatives from the Finance Ministry, were 
tasked with rehabilitating the project. In 1991, the company recorded its first accounting 
profit and Mahathir used the event to silence critics on his aggressive mega projects 
adventure. In 1995, Eric resigned abruptly from the company16 and a year later, a pre-tax 
loss of RM 376.54 million was reported, claimed to be due to the expansion project 
involving the building of a rolling mill. Despite the loss, the company managed to secure 
a second syndicated loan of RM 600 million approved by EPF in 1996. When Eric left 
the company in 1995, it had accumulated RM 10 billion in debts and losses, involving 
current liabilities of RM 9.26 million, long-term loans of RM 6.013 billion, and losses 
amounting to RM 2.985 billion (News Straits Times, 28 March 2003).  Table 1 presents 
the status of the company’s financial position in 1995. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Perwaja Finances in 1995 
 
Indebted     
Major Malaysian lenders to Perwaja RM million  Yr of Maturity 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers (syndicated loan) 135  2003 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 430  2004 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 270  2007 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2000 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2002 
Employees Provident Fund 710  2001 
Bills to pay    
Perwaja by the numbers:    
 End of 1998  End of 1997 
Direct loans owed to the government RM 4,015m  RM 3,174m 
Outstanding loans guaranteed by government (Local & Foreign) RM 5,122m  RM 5,682m 
Major Foreign Lenders to Perwaja    
 RM million  Yr of Maturity 
IBJ Leasing Services (Panama) Inc. 199.3  2003 
Standard Chartered Bank (Labuan) 1,520  2002 
Japanese Banking Consortium 685.5  2003 
 
Source: Lopez (2000) based on Malaysian government sources. 
 
 
                                                          
16 In an interview after being released from conviction, he revealed that he had received a letter from a 
senior official asking him to resign due to ill health. 
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Anwar Ibrahim, the former Finance Minister, instructed an independent audit firm, 
Coopers and Lybrand to examine Perwaja Terengganu’s 1988 insolvency status.  
Following the report received from the audit firm, Anwar disclosed in parliament that the 
actual loss was RM 2.9 billion and made a police report.  A government probe order was 
then issued on 10 April 1996 and the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA, now known as 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)) started investigating the company’s 
audited report for possible malpractices which had contributed to the loss. Furthermore, 
the new management of Perwaja Steel prepared an internal report where it alleged among 
others, the following: inaccurate accounting records, unauthorised contracts amounting 
to hundreds of millions of ringgit, misappropriation of funds, dubious maintenance 
contracts amounting to RM 292 million (including a contract amount of RM 200,000 per 
month to a company for gardening, cleaning and vehicle maintenance), and award of RM 
957 million contract to companies of a long time associate of Eric Chia (WTF, 15 
December 2011). 
On 16 June 1997, Perwaja Steel was handed over to two cronies: Abu Sahid of 
Maju Holdings, who took a 51% stake saw it as an opportunity to be known as a steel 
man, and the Pheng family of Kinsteel who took over the remaining to thwart threat to 
their own steel operations business. In 2008, Perwaja Holdings was listed on the main 
board of Bursa Malaysia and Perwaja Steel became its 100% subsidiary. EPF filed suit 
against Perwaja Steel for RM 4.5 billion and it went into receivership in December 2014. 
Table 2 illustrates the chronology of the emergence & demise of Perwaja Steel. 
 
Table 2 Chronology of the Emergence & Demise of Perwaja Steel 
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1982 1987 & 1988 1989 1995 & 1996 1997 2008 2014 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja Steel 
MD –Eric 
Chia 
Perwaja Steel 
Eric Chia 
resigned in 
1995 
Perwaja Steel 
 
Perwaja Steel 
became 100% 
subsidiary of 
Perwaja Bhd 
Perwaja 
Steel went 
into 
receivership 
Hicom 
(51%), 
Nippon 
(30%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Maju 
Holdings 
(51%) & 
Kinsteel 
(49%) 
 
Kinsteel 
owns 37% of 
Perwaja Bhd 
 
RM 250m 
paid-up 
capital & 
RM 500m 
loan from 
Export-
Import 
Bank of 
Japan 
 
Reported 
loss of RM 
131m in 
1986 & in 
1988 
reported 
total 
accumulated 
loss of RM 
1.2b & 
became 
insolvent in 
1988 
New 
company set 
up through 
govt. funding 
& loans from 
Bank 
Bumiputra 
(RM860 m) 
and EPF 
(RM130 
million) 
 
Reported pre-
tax loss of RM 
376.54m in 
1996. Secured 
funding of RM 
600m loan 
from EPF.  
Total 
accumulated 
losses of RM 
2.5b, long-term 
loans of RM 6b 
& current 
liabilities of 
RM 1b 
 Perwaja Bhd 
listed on 
main board of 
Bursa 
Malaysia 
EPF filed 
suit for RM 
4.5b 
  
 
 
Mahathir’s neoliberalism ideology of Malaysia Incorporation (Jomo, 2003) made 
him pursue an aggressive industrialization and privatisation agenda with the rhetoric of 
matching the other Asian Tigers regardless of the impact on the democratic process. 
Despite the project showing many signs of failure, he kept injecting more public funds 
into the ‘pet’ project as he perceive it as too important to fail to safe his ego and also to 
ward off increasing criticisms from his opponents. He turned to neoliberalist cronies for 
advice and support and in return promised protecting their interests by utilizing the 
infrastructural power. This supports the arguments by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) 
and Sikka (2015) that neoliberalism ideology legitimises competitive beings to indulge 
in endless pursuit as sign of success.  
 
3.2 Deployment of power and production of corruption 
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Although the ACA’s probe on Perwaja Steel started in 1996, no one had been implicated 
until 9th October 2004, when Eric Chia was arrested and charged for criminal breach of 
trust during the premiership of Abdullah Badawi. Eric was alleged to have dishonestly 
authorised payment of RM 76.4 million to the account of Frilsham Enterprise 
Incorporated (Frilsham) with the American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong for technical 
assistance agreement (TAA) provided to the Perwaja plant by a Japanese company, NKK 
Corporation, when in fact no such payments were due to these companies.  He was also 
alleged to have instructed payment of the same amount without the approval of the board 
of directors nor the tendering committee of the Perwaja Rolling Mill and Development.  
The offence was alleged to have been committed in his capacity as the managing director 
of Perwaja Steel between 4th November 1993 and 22nd February 1994.  
The ACA's failure to wrap up its investigation sooner and nab the perpetrators 
responsible for the RM 10 billion staggering losses at Perwaja Steel has been criticized 
by members of both the opposition and the ruling National Front (BN) coalition. Unlike 
in most countries, the ACA was under the Prime Minister’s Department which thus 
diminishes its power to act independently since investigation of the case began during 
Mahathir’s premiership. The timing of the arrest and allegation also raised further 
questions as Eric’s detention was not related to the huge debt and losses suffered by the 
company to bring the perpetrators to justice but rather a political ploy ahead of the 2004 
general election.  
 
Fig. 1. Deployment of Power and Production of Corruption  
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This suggests that Mahathir has succeeded in personalising his power by diverting 
decision-making authority on major policy issues to the Prime Minister's Department 
through utilising the packing and circumventing strategies in the case of the ACA and 
utilising the rigging strategy in determining his successors (i.e. Abdullah Badawi & also 
the current PM, Najib Razak) to ensure that he will not be implicated.  During the court 
proceedings, the weak internal control system and the working of a covert power became 
more apparent.  Figure 1 illustrates the main actors and their roles in the case. 
The former senior group general manager, Ahmad Zaini, in his comments on the 
case stated that although the TAA was meant to be free, the payment was made to 
Frilsham Enterprise’s account in the American Express Bank in Hong Kong following 
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Eric Chia’s approval (News Straits Times, 18 September 2004). In his financial report, 
Ahmad Zaini went on to state that the general manager of NKK Corporation, N. Otani, 
had confirmed in writing in a letter dated 11 October 1995 that Frilsham was not its 
associate company, hence NKK’s Otani did not sign any payment request letter but this 
letter was not produced in court. On the contrary, Akram Che Ayub, the former group 
senior operations manager, stated that the TAA was not free and that the request for 
payments should be staggered rather than paid in one lump sum.  A request letter for the 
payment bearing the signature of Otani dated 17 February 1994 was confirmed by Akram 
to be different from that on the TAA and the addendum (News Straits Times, 14 August 
2004). A letter instructing one lump sum payment to be remitted to Frislham’s account 
with the American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong had been made through Bank 
Bumiputera in Malaysia on 22 February 1994 (The Malay Mail, 14 August 2004). Lim 
Chaing Cheah, a former corporate director who instructed the payment, stated that he was 
ordered by Eric to proceed with it despite the absence of any supporting documents to 
justify the said payment.  Lim further pointed out that it was customary in the company 
that all payments17 made should first be authorised by Eric and countersigned by him. 
Lim said:  
“For example when a request for payment comes from overseas, we notify 
the managing director’s people. Once approval is given, we get the 
finance and accounting department to process it” (The Malay Mail, 3 
August 2004). 
 
Interestingly, the demised Arthur Andersen, the company’s external auditor, had all along 
issued ‘unqualified’ audit report until the company became insolvent.  The clean audit 
report on the company’s financial position had been presented to the board of directors 
                                                          
17 Payments for projects, constructions of plants, purchasing of raw materials and services that include 
technological consultancy (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004). 
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on 31 March 1994 and was approved during the annual general meeting (The Malay Mail, 
3 August 2004).  The responsibilities of Perwaja Steel’s corporate directors surpassed 
four pertinent departments viz. finance and accounting, administrative, corporate banking 
and management information system (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004), hence suggesting 
weak internal control system and poor corporate governance. The fact that the external 
auditor failed to probe further on the missing document suggests either incompetency or 
some involvement in the malpractice. 
However, a pertinent question in all this is the rationale of a Japanese company 
(NKK) requesting payments for its services to be made to the bank account of its associate 
company (Frilsham) in Hong Kong rather than directly to it. The scandal worsened when 
NKK was later found to be non-existent (The Malay Mail, 10 February, 2004) and that 
Frilsham’s account at American Express Bank in Hong Kong was closed on 28th July 
1994 i.e. about five months after the RM 76.4 million was paid into the account (News 
Straits Times, 17 September 2004). Australasian Business Intelligence (23 May 2002) 
reported that the payment appeared to have benefitted Sakyo Corporation, a company 
associated with Shahril, the son of Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir,18 a crony of Mahathir who 
was also closely linked to Eric Chia. While the use of Frilsham as an intermediary 
company or SPV may be deemed to be a cover up, this was made possible as Hong Kong 
is considered as one of the most lenient countries with loose regulations. In other words, 
the production of corrupt transactions and the choice of a safe haven to conceal the 
fraudulent act were the consequence of the adopted neoliberalism ideology, facilitated by 
the personalization of power that has weakened the various check and balance 
infrastructures in Malaysia. 
                                                          
18 He was a former engineer with Malaysian Telecommunication Department who retired in 1971 and 
started a family control company, Sapura Holdings, which bought UMW from Eric Chia.  
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The court proceedings further revealed of a covert power in action. Eric, in a letter 
addressed to the Chairman of Perwaja Steel, Zainal Abidin Sulong, in the minutes of the 
board’s meeting held on 30 March 1996, clearly stated that: (1) he was answerable only 
to the Prime Minister (PM-Mahathir); (2) he was mandated by the PM to operate Perwaja 
as if it belonged to him; (3) he implemented projects only after the PM had granted 
approval; (4) he received no salary or benefits from Perwaja during his service; and (5) 
his service as managing director in Perwaja is determined by the PM.  This clearly 
indicates Mahathir’s success in creating loyalist cronies like Eric who is willing to 
implicate himself rather than to risk his ‘friendship’ with Mahathir.  
According to the minutes of the board of directors meeting on 4 July 1993, it was 
reported that Eric informed the board that he had met Anwar Ibrahim, the Finance 
Minister the day before (i.e. 3 July 1993) who agreed to waive a circular19 dated 6 August 
1985 which requires all companies under the government to get approval for any tenders 
amounting RM 15 million and above.  Eric also suggested for the formation of a tendering 
committee20 comprising of himself as the chairman together with the other two directors, 
Nik Mohamad Affandi and Zubir Embong. The board unanimously approved the 
procedure for the purchases and awards of contracts as directed by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and proposal for the tendering committee.  The board’s chairman, Zainal 
Abidin Sulong, further reported that the board also approved Eric to conclude purchases 
and contracts without referring to the tendering committee for consumable goods like 
electrodes, scrap, iron ore, lubricants, etc., and any contracts of RM 5 million and below. 
Ironically, another former board director who was also the MOF’s representative on the 
board, Nik Mohd Affandi Nik Yusoff, told the court that the MOF had never forced the 
                                                          
19 The Circular: is a strict financial guideline which requires companies in which the Government owns at 
least 51% equity, to keep the MOF informed on projects, tenders, and purchases at the initial stage of 
negotiations. 
20 The tender committee needs to approve all contracts or purchase of RM 15 million or above. 
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company to activate its tendering committee and he also disagreed with some parts of the 
minutes of meeting which stated that the MOF had agreed to exempt the company from 
seeking approval for purchases and contracts of RM 15 million and above.  These are not 
the comments of equal parties to a commercial transaction, hence implying a calculated 
paternalism.  Furthermore, evidence shows all these liberal gestures were being carefully 
recorded as part of an accounting process directed at securing contracts. In a nutshell, 
Mahathir has not only managed to pack the company with loyalists but more importantly, 
to circumvent the infrastructural power of the MOF by frustrating the rules in place. The 
establishment of the ad hoc National Economic Action Council, headed by Mahathir’s 
closest ally, Daim, was further evidence of circumvention of Anwar's power in restraining 
the usage of public funds to rescue and support cronies in trouble. 
When the Anti-Corruption Agency’s (ACA) investigating officer, Han Chee Rull, 
was asked by the court if he had (1) obtained recorded statement from the PM, (2) seen 
the correspondence between Eric Chia and the PM, (3) knew about the PM’s visit to the 
NKK’s plant in Japan before the TAA was signed, and (4) Eric Chia’s three suits that had 
been filed against NKK Corporation, Lim Guan Eng and The Malay Mail, he confirmed 
that no recorded statement was taken from Mahathir and that he was unaware of the other 
three issues.  The admission of unawareness on the many incidents related to the accused 
Eric Chia by the ACA investigating officer responsible in handling the case, implied some 
form of subjugation and control of the course of justice by Mahathir. As mentioned 
earlier, the packing and circumvention strategies by locating the ACA under the PM’s 
Department constrain the effectiveness of the agency to act independently and to remain 
subservient to the leadership. 
Rais Yatim, the then Minister in the PM’s Department, reported that the Swiss 
Government was prepared to cooperate with the Malaysian authorities in probing the 
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missing Perwaja Steel’s money in Swiss bank accounts (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004) 
and that the ACA, under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill 2002, can make 
an official request to freeze the bank accounts of those allegedly involved in the scandal.  
He further reported that 3 senior ACA officers went to Zurich and Japan to find the last 
piece of evidence to wrap up the investigations.  However, the ACA officers claimed that 
they did not get cooperation from the Zurich bank and the Japanese banking authorities, 
hence the vital evidence could not be sought. Rais’s comments on Mahathir’s relative 
invisibility in the case ensured he was able to maintain friendly ‘relations’ with the 
powerful leader of the ruling party. The PM’s office is packed with loyalists and it serves 
as the nerve centre in rewarding loyalists and punishing opponents.  
In 2007, Eric was acquitted of the charges by the Judge, Akhtar Tahir, who said 
that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against Eric on two grounds. 
Firstly, failure to call two material witnesses, former secretary of Perwaja Steel, Durai 
Rajasingam, and the five Japanese witnesses including the director of NKK Corporation, 
N. Otani. The Judge raised his concerns on the uncalled witnesses respectively, saying: 
 
“...Yet the prosecution never called him [Rajasingam]. The question is why? I see 
nothing to say that he would be a hostile witness or give evidence against 
them.........I wonder whether it was the Japanese witnesses who were reluctant or 
the prosecution was the one reluctant to bring them here..” (Thestaronline, 27 June 
2007). 
 
Secondly, the conflicts in the tendering documents – the prosecution insisted that the 
TAA was free but when tendering its document at the trial, they stated the agreements 
would be effective upon receiving the first payment while NKK Corporation’s document 
stated the amount should be paid in one lump sum. The release of Eric Chia from all the 
criminal breach of trust charges on 26 June 2007 (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007) provided 
some form of comfort for the other perpetrators who have links with political patronage 
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as they will escape the law. The judiciary was one of the earliest (since 1988) institutions 
packed by Mahathir in order to enhance his infrastructural power and Eric’s trial was seen 
by critics as another ‘wayang’ (theatrical act).   
The Perwaja Steel fraud case which dragged for 11 years (from 1996 until 2007) 
was indeed one of the country’s longest investigations.  The involvement of foreign 
institutions and powerful individuals was blamed for the case being dragged for so long.  
While this might be true due to the nature of the case, it may also be seen as a tactic used 
by the relevant parties as a massive cover up exercise hoping that people will forget about 
it with the passing of time (Grenfell, 1979). Table 3 summarises the chronology of events 
on the role of Mahathir and his cronies in the production of corruption and how he used 
the state apparatus and his loyal cronies and other political elites to ensure he was never 
implicated nor referred to in the Perwaja Steel fiasco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Chronology of events of the Perwaja debacle 
 
Year Events Neoliberalism & Personalisation of power by an autocrat 
1982 Perwaja Terengganu was established as a 
joint venture between the government and 
Nippon Steel Corp of Japan in the east 
coast of Malaysia although steel was 
consumed in huge volumes in the west 
coast, which clearly is a recipe for disaster. 
 
Mahathir justified his decision by 
claiming that he was taking 
industrialisation to the east coast of 
Malaysia to help develop the state. 
1986 Perwaja Terengganu accumulated losses of 
RM 131 million.  
Mahathir blamed it on appreciation of the 
yen and not on poor management skills 
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of his inexperienced cronies in the steel 
sector.  
 
1987 Eric Chia mandated to investigate why the 
project failed.  
Mahathir used Eric as his Mr Fixit to help 
rescue his failing pet project.  
 
1988 Perwaja Terengganu went into solvency. 
 
Mahathir did not want to admit failure of 
his project, hence rejected proposals to 
turn around the company to profitable 
venture.  
 
1988 Perwaja Steel was established and Eric was 
appointed as managing director. 
 
Mahathir used one of the state agencies, 
EPF to provide syndicated loan to help 
Eric managed the new company. 
Representatives from MOF sat on the 
board of the company. 
 
1991 Perwaja Steel recorded its first profit. 
 
Mahathir used the event to justify that his 
action in appointing Eric to manage his 
new project was correct to ward off 
criticisms on his mega projects. 
 
1995 Eric Chia resigned from Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir ordered Eric to resign.  
 
1996 Perwaja Steel reported a pre-tax loss of 
RM 376.54 million. 
 
Mahathir used EPF for the second time to 
provide syndicated loan. 
1996 Anwar Ibrahim disclosed in parliament 
Perwaja’s actual loss to be RM2.9 billion 
based on the report by Coopers & Lybrand 
who was tasked to investigate Perwaja 
Terengganu’s insolvency status. 
 
Anwar instructed ACA to begin 
investigation on the company’s audited 
report by Arthur Andersen for possible 
malpractices and fraud that have 
contributed to the loss.  
1997 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd bought 51% stake 
in Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir helped another of his Malay 
crony, Abu Sahid to acquire the business 
and only in 2003 the deal was inked and 
for the company to assume control. 
 
1998 Anwar Ibrahim was expelled from the 
government as he was against injecting 
public funds on failing projects and those 
that do not benefit society. 
 
Mahathir used the judiciary institution to 
imprison Anwar for sodomy allegation 
and other corruption charges. 
2004  Eric was arrested and charged of criminal 
breach of trust involving RM 76.4 million.  
 
Abdullah Badawi who superseded 
Mahathir used Eric’s detention as a 
political ploy ahead of the 2004’s general 
election rather than actually bringing the 
culprit to justice. 
 
2007 Eric was acquitted by the judge.  
 
The prosecution team failed to bring the 
key witnesses and produced conflicting 
documents causing the case to be 
dropped. 
 
 
 
4. Reflections and conclusion 
Combating corruption on both the demand and supply side requires understanding of the 
context and logic of the actors conducting the affairs in modern societies. In developing 
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countries, economic policies and actions are often in the hands of the political elites and 
the doctrine of neoliberalism has been a convenient vehicle in legitimising their exercise 
of power in turning the state’s assets into private enterprises and in deregulating economic 
activities, as well as in empowering themselves and their cronies in defending their 
decisions and outcomes. The main criticism on the symbiotic relationship between the 
political elites and business cronies is the excessive misuse of power to the degree that it 
corrupts the economic and political principles of public service (Sikka, 2008; Bakre, 
2008). Hence, any effort at curbing corruption requires scrutiny of the political ambition 
and democratic spirit of the ‘tone at the top’. When a country is allowed to be run by an 
increasingly authoritarian personality without constraints on the despotic power, then the 
country’s institutional infrastructure that provides the check and balance may be 
weakened by the aspiring autocrat through various means of personalisation of power 
(Slater, 2003).  
We demonstrate, using Perwaja Steel as a case study, how a political leader’s 
form of neoliberalism ideology helped him pursue his aggressive industrialization agenda 
by turning to his cronies and political loyalists to help realize his ambitions and visions. 
He facilitated political elites to form a small interlocking group to accumulate wealth 
either individually or collectively. Such interlocking state cannot be maintained in 
competitive market but when political elites and crony capitalists are entwined, then 
corrupt and incompetent political elites can maintain the small-hub network by colluding 
through the awards of tenders or projects within their networks. More importantly, we 
show how personalization of power through the strategies of packing, rigging and 
circumventing have weakened the institutional infrastructure such as the judiciary, anti-
corruption agencies, and police, that provides the check and balance in protecting public 
interest.  
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The nature of fraudulent in a state-owned company is understandably different 
than in public or family owned business. The failure and scandals of state-owned 
companies in Malaysia have escalated since the 1980s (Malaysian Airlines, Port Klang 
Free Zone, etc.) and this can be attributed to the ‘bossism’ political leadership and the 
control of the economic machinery. The latest scandal in 2015 is the 1MDB, a sovereign 
wealth fund set up in 2009 by the current Prime Minister, Najib.  All these scandals share 
the same modus operandi and if the root of the problem i.e. the autocratic leadership is 
not tackled, then corruption in the country will continue.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, we present an in-depth analysis of 
only one case study of a failed state-owned company in Malaysia. Future studies can 
adopt multiple-case study method to show the commonality and differences of the main 
actors, collaborators and institutions involved in the production of corruption. Secondly, 
our case study analysis relies on secondary data and future research may use interviews 
with members of political parties, lawyers, accountants, and this will provide better 
voices on the corruption problem.  Thirdly, we did not discuss the preventive strategies 
suitable for the country and hence, future studies may consider this. Fourthly, as a 
multiracial and multi-religious nation, the underlying philosophical and ethical doctrines 
for conducting economic activities other than neoliberalism may be considered.  
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Table 1 A summary of Perwaja finances in 1995 
 
INDEBTED 
 
Major Malaysian lenders to Perwaja  
 RM million  Yr of Maturity 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers (syndicated loan) 135 2003 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 430 2004 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 270 2007 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600 2000 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600 2002 
Employees Provident Fund 710 2001 
 
BILLS TO PAY 
 
Perwaja by the numbers:  
 RM million 
End of 1998 
 RM million 
End of 1997 
Direct loans owed to the government RM 4,015m RM 3,174m 
Outstanding loans guaranteed by government  
(Local and foreign) 
 
RM 5,122m  RM 5,682m 
Major Foreign Lenders to Perwaja  
 RM million  Yr of Maturity 
IBJ Leasing Services (Panama) Inc. 199.3 2003 
Standard Chartered Bank (Labuan) 1,520 2002 
Japanese Banking Consortium 685.5 2003 
 
Source: Lopez (2000) based on Malaysian government sources. 
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Table 2 Chronology of the emergence & demise of Perwaja Steel 
1982 1987 & 
1988 
1989 1995 & 1996 1997 2008 2014 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja 
Steel 
MD –Eric 
Chia 
Perwaja Steel 
Eric Chia 
resigned in 
1995 
Perwaja 
Steel 
 
Perwaja Steel 
became 100% 
subsidiary of 
Perwaja Bhd 
 
Perwaja 
Steel went 
into 
receivership 
Hicom 
(51%), 
Nippon 
(30%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Maju 
Holdings 
(51%) & 
Kinsteel 
(49%) 
 
Kinsteel owns 
37% of 
Perwaja Bhd 
 
RM 250m 
paid-up 
capital & 
RM 500m 
loan from 
Export-
Import Bank 
of Japan 
 
Reported 
loss of RM 
131m in 
1986 & in 
1988 
reported 
total 
accumulated 
loss of RM 
1.2b & 
became 
insolvent in 
1988 
New 
company set 
up through 
govt. 
funding & 
loans from 
Bank 
Bumiputra 
(RM860 m) 
and EPF 
(RM130 
million) 
 
Reported pre-
tax loss of RM 
376.54m in 
1996. Secured 
funding of RM 
600m loan from 
EPF.  
Total 
accumulated 
losses of RM 
2.5b, long-term 
loans of RM 6b 
& current 
liabilities of 
RM 1b 
 
 Perwaja Bhd 
listed on main 
board of Bursa 
Malaysia 
EPF filed 
suit for RM 
4.5b 
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Figure 1 Deployment of power and production of corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    PM 
Cronies 
Eric Chia 
Maju Holdings 
(MD -Abu Sahid) 
Kinsteel 
(MD- Mr Pheng)  
Sakyo 
(Shahril Shamsuddin) 
Rais Yatim 
(Special minster at 
the PM Office) 
Perwaja Steel 
Directors 
- Ahmad Zaini 
- Akram Ayub 
- Lim Chaing Cheah 
- Zainal Sulong 
Finance Minister 
(Anwar Ibrahim) 
Opponent 
Audit 
Firm 
ACA under 
PM’s office 
(Han Chee Rull) 
Judiciary 
(Judge for 
case-Akhtar 
Tahir) 
Police 
BBMB 
(owned by UMNO) 
Frilsham associate – SPV 
American Express Bank (HK) 
Zurich Bank 
International 
facilitator 
Infrastructural powers 
Coopers & Lybrand 
investigation 
   Arthur  
Andersen 
Money transferred 
back  
Perwaja   Terengganu 
MD 
Perwaja Holdings 
listed on main 
board of Bursa 
Malaysia 
In 2008) 
£ 
$ 
RM 
¥ 
£ 
$ 
RM 
¥ 
51% 
49% 
RM76.4m 
NKK (Japan-non existent)  
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Table 3 Chronology of events of the Perwaja debacle 
 
Year Events Neoliberalism & Personalisation of power by an autocrat 
1982 Perwaja Terengganu was established as a joint 
venture between the government and Nippon 
Steel Corp of Japan in the east coast of 
Malaysia although steel was consumed in huge 
volumes in the west coast, which clearly is a 
recipe for disaster. 
 
Mahathir justified his decision by claiming 
that he was taking industrialisation to the 
east coast of Malaysia to help develop the 
state. 
1986 Perwaja Terengganu accumulated losses of 
RM 131 million.  
Mahathir blamed it on appreciation of the 
yen and not on poor management skills of 
his inexperienced cronies in the steel sector.  
 
1987 Eric Chia mandated to investigate why the 
project failed.  
Mahathir used Eric as his Mr Fixit to help 
rescue his failing pet project.  
 
1988 Perwaja Terengganu went into solvency. 
 
Mahathir did not want to admit failure of his 
project, hence rejected proposals to turn 
around the company to profitable venture.  
 
1988 Perwaja Steel was established and Eric was 
appointed as managing director. 
 
Mahathir used one of the state agencies, 
EPF to provide syndicated loan to help Eric 
managed the new company. Representatives 
from MOF sat on the board of the company. 
 
1991 Perwaja Steel recorded its first profit. 
 
Mahathir used the event to justify that his 
action in appointing Eric to manage his new 
project was correct to ward off criticisms on 
his mega projects. 
 
1995 Eric Chia resigned from Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir ordered Eric to resign.  
 
1996 Perwaja Steel reported a pre-tax loss of RM 
376.54 million. 
 
Mahathir used EPF for the second time to 
provide syndicated loan. 
1996 Anwar Ibrahim disclosed in parliament 
Perwaja’s actual loss to be RM2.9 billion 
based on the report by Coopers & Lybrand 
who was tasked to investigate Perwaja 
Terengganu’s insolvency status. 
 
Anwar instructed ACA to begin 
investigation on the company’s audited 
report by Arthur Andersen for possible 
malpractices and fraud that have contributed 
to the loss.  
1997 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd bought 51% stake in 
Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir helped another of his Malay 
crony, Abu Sahid to acquire the business 
and only in 2003 the deal was inked and for 
the company to assume control. 
 
1998 Anwar Ibrahim was expelled from the 
government as he was against injecting public 
funds on failing projects and those that do not 
benefit society. 
 
Mahathir used the judiciary institution to 
imprison Anwar for sodomy allegation and 
other corruption charges. 
2004  Eric was arrested and charged of criminal 
breach of trust involving RM 76.4 million.  
 
Abdullah Badawi who superseded Mahathir 
used Eric’s detention as a political ploy 
ahead of the 2004’s general election rather 
than actually bringing the culprit to justice. 
 
2007 Eric was acquitted by the judge.  
 
The prosecution team failed to bring the key 
witnesses and produced conflicting 
documents causing the case to be dropped. 
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